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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DRIVING ON THE CENTER LINE: MISSOURI PHYSICIANS’
POTENTIAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS FOR FAILING TO
WARN OF MEDICATION SIDE EFFECTS

I. INTRODUCTION
Many people approach administered medications with caution. Due to
concerns about the side effects that these medications could have on their
ability to perform daily activities, people are hesitant to consume prescribed
medications. For many, however, there is no alternative to taking administered
medications. Therefore, to minimize the effects that medication may have on a
patient’s daily routine, physicians need to provide information to their patients
about potential side effects. With this information, patients can decide whether
to take the medication at a certain time of the day or otherwise ensure that the
medication is taken properly. But who should bear the burden of providing
individuals with this knowledge? In answering this question, courts are
divided and tend to drive on the center line between making physicians liable
and placing the burden on patients themselves. The cases in which courts have
had to deal with the issue of a physician’s liability to the general public
typically involve vehicular accidents. Specifically, this area of tort law is
confined mostly to situations where a medicated patient operates a vehicle and
causes an accident.
Without adequate information, people taking medications may not properly
adjust their daily routines. Consider, for example, Attorney Smith, a patient of
Doctor Jones. Attorney Smith was recently prescribed a new medication to
help ease some joint stiffness. Because Doctor Jones failed to issue additional
precautions about the side effects of this new medication, Attorney Smith
believed there were no additional risks when taking the medicine. However,
because this new medication causes drowsiness in most people, Attorney
Smith’s productivity level that day suffered. What if Doctor Jones’ patient was
instead Driver Dan? Again, assume that Doctor Jones failed to issue additional
precautions to Driver Dan. Consequently, Driver Dan took the prescribed
medication and drove his vehicle. Because Doctor Jones failed to issue a
warning, all drivers on the roadway must bear the risk of Driver Dan’s
drowsiness. If Attorney Smith, now just a fellow driver on the highway with
Driver Dan, is hit by Driver Dan’s vehicle as a result of Driver Dan’s impaired
condition, Attorney Smith will want to place the blame on someone. But who
should bear the burden, the doctor or the patient? To answer this question, two
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basic issues must be considered: (1) in what circumstances does the physician
have informational advantages over the patient, so that the doctor should be
responsible for issuing warnings about side effects; and (2) if the physician is
liable, what warning would be sufficient to discharge the duty owed to third
persons to warn of side effects of administered medication?
These
considerations arise during any discussion of physician liability to third parties.
Missouri is one of the only jurisdictions that has not yet created physician
liability to third persons for failing to issue warnings about medication side
effects.1 The standard Missouri adopts will likely rest on a policy of personal
responsibility2 as emphasized in previous Missouri case law. This policy
would impose greater liability on individuals when they have an informational
advantage over the physician, such as when they consume alcohol before
driving a vehicle. In addition, any standard Missouri adopts will likely include
an assimilation of the judicial models created by other jurisdictions for this
area of law.
Missouri must not sacrifice the professional integrity of physicians by
imposing greater burdens upon them. This Comment will argue that Missouri
courts should find that physicians3 may be liable to the general driving public
under a simple duty to warn standard, only if patients bring a general
negligence claim.4 To discharge this duty, the physician need only provide a
patient with warnings when he administers the medications.5 Once the
physician provides the patient with this information, the physician’s duty is
discharged. The physician should be under no duty to control the activities of
the patient beyond a general warning. In addition, Missouri courts should not
attempt to qualify the duty based on the type of medication given.6 The
1. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Liability of Physician, for Injury to or
Death of Third Party, Due to Failure to Disclose Driving-Related Impediment, 43 A.L.R. 4TH
153 (1986) (discussing in detail at least twelve jurisdictions that have rendered significant
decisions regarding this issue of physician liability).
2. See infra notes 184-208.
3. The group charged with this duty may be expansive enough to include an entire health
care provider group, such as a hospital or a medical group, but most likely will be limited to
individual physicians since there is an inherent desire to hold responsible the individual able to
give orders affecting a person’s physical well-being.
4. The Missouri Supreme Court found that duty cases of this type need to be brought within
the medical negligence statute of limitations. It also noted that the application to this statute
applies whether the claim is that of medical malpractice or general negligence. See Robinson v.
Health Midwest Dev. Group, 58 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. 2001) (en banc).
5. While it may prove to be administratively cumbersome, physicians may want to consider
having patients sign a waiver whether they will be driving or not. However, this may already be
general practice for many medical facilities and hospital emergency rooms.
6. For example, a physician who either orders or administers a drug to the patient while in
his office would obviously have more control over the conditions under which the drug is given.
See Lisa M. Nuttall, Tort Law – Foreseeability v. Public Policy Considerations in Determining
the Duty of Physicians to Non-patients – Lester v. Hall, 30 N.M. L. REV. 351, 360-61 (2000);
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physician should possess the same duty for any medication given within the
physician’s presence. In addition, physician liability should not replace
individual driving duties and responsibilities. Missouri courts should not
impose a duty in situations where other impairing factors, such as alcohol, may
be involved. Only when a patient takes the medication within the physician’s
immediate presence should the physician have a potential duty to the general
public.7 Any other result would compromise the professional integrity of the
medical profession.
This Comment provides a practical judicial model for Missouri courts to
follow. Part II discusses the effect that the landmark duty to warn case of
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California8 had on potential physician
liability to third parties and the issues Tarasoff left open. Part III analyzes the
judicial models of Texas, Washington and New Mexico to show how Missouri
could structure its own standard. Part IV examines the traditional duties
imposed upon Missouri physicians, extensions of these traditional duties and
issues left unanswered by Missouri case law regarding liability to third
persons. Part V discusses Missouri’s public policy, which favors allocating
liability to third parties between the physician who fails to warn of medication
side effects and the individual patient who inflicted the harm. Finally, in Part
VI this Comment concludes that based on Missouri’s case law and public
policy, individual responsibility should mitigate physician liability to third
persons.
II. THE DUTY TO WARN—TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA
Any discussion of a duty to warn should begin by considering the first case
to impose this duty, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.9 While
Tarasoff focused on the duty that psychotherapists owe to third parties, it has
become a seminal case regarding a doctor’s duties to third parties generally.10
Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d 590, 592-93 (N.M. 1998). However, a physician who prescribes an
antibiotic to his patient, but does not discuss the potential side effects with the patient, may have
less control over the way that the patient takes the medication and when it is taken. See Nuttall,
supra, at 360-61; Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989).
7. This is not to say that physicians would not otherwise be liable to their patients for
failure to warn of medication side effects, but this would need to be brought as a medical
malpractice claim, not general negligence. See generally Linda A. Sharp, Malpractice:
Physician’s Liability for Injury or Death Resulting from Side Effects of Drugs Intentionally
Administered to or Prescribed for Patient, 47 A.L.R. 5TH 533 (1997).
8. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
9. Id.
10. See Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New
Directions for the 1990’s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 33-35 (1992) (classifying one of
Tarasoff’s broadest extensions to be the consideration of a duty owed by a physician to a third
party for failure to warn the patient of medication side effects); Fillmore Buckner & Marvin
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In Tarasoff, the court paved the way for cases regarding physician liability to
third parties when failing to warn of medication side effects. The following
famous language from Tarasoff provides a foundation for the doctor’s duty to
the general public: “[t]he protective privilege ends where the public peril
begins.”11
Suprisingly, the facts of Tarasoff contributed to the development of a
complex web of general duty cases. In Tarasoff, Patient Prosenjit Poddar
admitted to his psychologist that he intended to kill Tatiana, a fellow classmate
and love interest, upon her return from a summer trip to Brazil.12 Campus
police took no action to warn either Tatiana or her parents after the police were
notified by Poddar’s psychologist of Poddar’s intentions, even though the
psychologist suggested detaining Poddar.13 After examining Poddar, however,
the psychologists decided that Poddar’s mental condition did not warrant
confinement of him at the time and released him.14 After she returned, Poddar
went to Tatiana’s home and shot her with a pellet gun, pursued her into the
back yard, and stabbed her to death with a kitchen knife.15 It is clear from
Tarasoff that if the doctor had warned Tatiana of the potential dangers, she
may have escaped death.
Tarasoff broke new ground by holding that a psychologist’s professional
duty to his patients included a duty to warn third persons of a known danger.
The concept of duty assumes that in situations of a particular type, the actor
that causes damage should be held liable for the actions taken or not taken.16
The court described duty as “not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”17 The common law concept of
duty imposed an obligation upon the psychologists to warn Tatiana of Poddar’s

Firestone, “Where the Public Peril Begins” 25 Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 20203 (2000).
11. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347; Perlin, supra note 10, at 33.
12. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339-40.
13. See id. at 340; Buckner & Firestone, supra note 10, at 194-95 (suggesting that the
parents were possibly not aware of details of the threats against Tatiana and the attempts to
confine Poddar until the psychiatrist testified at court).
14. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340-41; Buckner & Firestone, supra note 9, at 193.
15. Buckner & Firestone, supra note 9, at 194.
16. For example, when a special relationship exists between two parties, liability for
nonfeasance is a remedy for the injured party. See Allison L. Almason, Personal Liability
Implications of the Duty to Warn are Hard Pills to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v.
Patel and Beyond, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 471, 474 (1997).
17. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
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intentions to harm her.18 After Tarasoff, many courts expanded its holding to
cover a health care professional’s duty to protect the general public.19
Tarasoff staked out the general boundaries of the nature of duty,
specifically a doctor’s duty to a third person.20 It explicitly instructed that for a
duty to be imposed, a special relationship must exist between the physician and
either the foreseeable victim or the person likely to inflict the harm.21 Without
a special relationship, physicians cannot be burdened with a duty to control the
party in question.22 Before Tarasoff, foreseeability was not considered the
most important factor used when determining whether a duty is owed.23 The
court in Tarasoff held that the foreseeability of Tatiana’s injuries required the
doctor to warn her of potential risks.24 Thus, the harm caused to a third person
needs to be foreseeable to the physician at the time the side effect warning
should have been given for a duty to third persons to exist.
Physicians can only be expected to meet a reasonable professional
standard. Tarasoff provided that the physician is not required to act perfectly
when preventing harm to the potential victim, because such a standard may not
be feasible for any professional.25 Rather, the standard should be “that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of that professional specialty under similar

18. See id. at 343 (imposing this duty only upon the psychologists, and not the police
officers who were to confine Poddar since they did not have a special relationship with Poddar
that could be extended to Tatiana).
19. See Buckner & Firestone, supra note 10, at 202-03 (explaining that the effect of the
Tarasoff decision has influenced decisions in medical fields outside of psychiatry in two specific
areas: (1) driving related dangers and (2) transmission of infectious diseases). See also Perlin,
supra note 10, at 29-30 (stating that while the Tarasoff legend had grown to “mythic
proportions”, no other judicial decision has received this level of recognition).
20. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 114 (1994) (stating that
Tarasoff’s statement of the nature of duty incorporates “three critical points: (1) an analysis of
liability in tort begins with the question of ‘duty’; (2) ‘duty,’ in itself, is neither sacrosanct nor
immutable and is merely a conclusion as to whether liability should attach under specified
conditions; and (3) the determination of when a duty is owed depends on policy considerations”).
21. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976); Charles
E. Cantu & Margaret H. Jones Hopson, Bitter Medicine: A Critical Look at the Mental Health
Care Provider’s Duty to Warn in Texas, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 359, 372 (2000) (stating that while
jurisdictions vary in their application of the Tarasoff doctrine, all include that a special
relationship exists between patient and physician).
22. Prior to Tarasoff, common law stated that a person does not owe an affirmative duty to
protect a certain person from danger or harm. See Almason, supra note 16, at 474 (stating that
under the Tarasoff decision, if a special relationship exists, then the actor has a duty to control the
third person).
23. See Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at 368 (stating that in Tarasoff II, the court
identified foreseeability of harm to be the greatest factor creating a duty to warn).
24. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343-44.
25. See id. at 345.
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circumstances.”26 The reasonableness of the action is based upon the
traditional negligence standard that exists for the circumstances in question.27
Even though professional standards may prohibit disclosing confidential
physician-patient information, the court advised that this concern should not be
given great weight.28 After weighing the costs and benefits, any harm caused
to the plaintiff resulting from the patient’s actions negates the consequences of
the therapist’s breach of confidentiality.29 Thus, Tarasoff provides a sound
basis for public policy analysis.
After Tarasoff, there are numerous open issues relating to warnings of
medication side effects. Tarasoff suggested that its decision should not be
limited to situations where the physician had a special relationship to both the
patient and the victim.30 A doctor must warn his patient of the potential
dangers associated with his condition or medications that may cause him to be
dangerous to others.31 While applying Tarasoff’s holding to driving related
impairments may be dubious, the court in dicta does provide for this
possibility.32 Additionally, Tarasoff did not directly provide whether the
general public placed at risk by driving related impairments would be a
foreseeable victim. Therefore, the question is—how far the court expected the
concept of duty to stretch, considering the importance of foreseeability?

26. See Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at 368.
27. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976). Imposing
a duty to warn third persons is independent from a physician’s duty to diagnose, which is strictly
applicable to his patients. See Almason, supra note 16, at 487-88. Several states, including
Louisiana, have held that duty to warn cases do not fall under the state medical malpractice
statute. See id. at 488. This distinction has caused commentators to then call into question the
actual existence of this physician duty if it rests outside of the physician’s professional standards.
Id. at 496.
28. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346-47. While there may always be some confidentiality
presumed between physicians and patients, dealing with mental health care patients may entail
more personal involvement. Thus, general health care providers may not be subjected to such a
risk as addressed in Tarasoff. See Perlin, supra note 10, at 35-36.
29. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346-47.
30. See id. at 344.
31. See id. at 343-44 (stating that such dangers included driving dangers); see also Perlin,
supra note 10, at 34 (considering the application of Tarasoff to driving impairment cases to be an
example of the broadest extension of this decision).
32. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343-44 (citing Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14
(Wash. 1965)); Almason, supra note 16, at 475 (reiterating that the Tarasoff court stated a duty to
warn situation is analogous to cases where the physician fails to warn others of a patient’s
communicable disease, implying the potential effects of the Tarasoff decision on duty to warn
third person cases).
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III. JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE MISSOURI
When deciding cases of first impression, the Supreme Court of Missouri
will inevitably look to other jurisdictions for guidance.33 Several jurisdictions
have created common law variations of a duty to warn directed towards
physicians.34 Courts in Texas, Washington and New Mexico35 have all
rendered decisions that provide a good backdrop for analyzing a physician’s
duty to warn the general public. The Texas model creates a broad general duty
owed by physicians to foreseeable third persons when the physician has
informational advantages over the patient, but rejects any duty to control the
patient. The Washington model provides a moderate standard, which imposes
physician liability for injuries inflicted on foreseeable third parties, but also
limits this liability in cases of intervening driver negligence. Finally, the New
Mexico model focuses on the public need for good available health care and
limits a physician’s duty owed to third parties to situations where the physician
personally controlled the administration of medication in his office.
A.

Texas: The Gooden v. Tips Legacy

In Texas, the likelihood of physicians possessing a broad general duty to
foreseeable third persons, including the driving public, when the physician
fails to warn his patient of medication side effects is high. In Gooden v. Tips,
the court held that a physician owes a duty to the general driving public when
failing to properly warn a patient of medication side effects.36 In Gooden,
Doctor Tips had treated his patient for almost twenty years prior to the accident
in question, which clearly demonstrated a patient-physician relationship.37
Doctor Tips therefore knew the medical history of the patient, including her
propensity to abuse drugs and to not take medication in the manner intended.
Nevertheless, he neglected to warn his patient not to drive or operate
machinery while under the influence of the drug Quaalude.38 Consequently,

33. See Kevin L. Kelley, Negligence – Third Party Liability – Physician Owed Duty of Care
to Third Party When His Negligence in Failing to Warn Patient Not to Drive Contributes to Third
Party’s Injury, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 493, 499-500 (1984) (stating that the decision in Gooden
relied on three cases from other jurisdictions to decide its decision of first impression); Buckner
& Firestone, supra note 10, at 203 (stating that Kaiser was followed in other jurisdictions both
before and after the decision of Tarasoff).
34. For a discussion of some of the variances taken by state courts, see generally Cantu &
Hopson, supra note 21, at 372-79.
35. Judicial decisions in these three jurisdictions offer a good discussion of precedental
cases, which Missouri courts may choose to follow.
36. Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1983) (deciding an issue of first impression
in Texas, necessitating an evaluation of other jurisdictions having already decided this issue).
37. See id. at 365; Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at 381.
38. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 365; see also Kelley, supra note 33, at 494-96 (stating that
courts rendering decisions in this area of law need to discuss the doctrine of privity between the

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

880

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:873

everyone in the driving realm of the patient was at risk of the patient’s
impaired condition caused by the medication. Gooden held that any of those
drivers were foreseeable victims.39
Gooden framed the issue as a two-part inquiry. First, the court considered
whether a physician who prescribes a medication and knows or should have
known of the medication’s side effect has a duty to the public to warn the
patient not to drive.40 Second, the court contemplated whether the physician
has a duty under the circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injury to a third
person that the patient may come in contact with.41 After consulting the law of
other jurisdictions, Gooden found a duty to warn when that person “was in the
general field of danger which should reasonably have been foreseen by the
doctor when he administered the drug.”42 Thus, a physician could owe a duty
to the general driving public. After Gooden, a court could find a general duty
without considering whether the doctor had an informational advantage over
the patient. This standard makes a physician’s duty to third persons very
broad.
Despite its breadth, Gooden did reject one important aspect of Tarasoff’s
reasoning.43 The physician’s duty did not include the duty to control the
conduct of the patient.44 Therefore, under Gooden, a physician need only tell
the patient not to drive in order to discharge the duty to warn.45 Following
Gooden, other decisions have found a similarly specific, yet limited duty.46
Thus, the Texas model provides that while the physician does have a general
duty, giving a simple warning may easily discharge the duty.
Since Gooden, the physician’s duty to warn in Texas has been further
limited. In two specific instances, courts have not imposed third person
liability upon physicians when the physician does not have an informational
advantage over the patient. For example, in Flynn v. Houston Emergicare,
Inc., the court held that physicians treating patients known to have taken mindaltering drugs, such as cocaine, did not owe a duty to warn the general driving
doctor and the third party, so that the decision would be applicable to future situations, which is
something that the court in Gooden failed to do).
39. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 369-70.
40. Id. at 366.
41. See id.
42. See Kelley, supra note 33, at 501.
43. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 370.
44. Id.; Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at 381-82. Physicians do not “take charge” of their
patients in such a way as to control the patient’s driving propensities.
45. See Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 370 (deciding only that the warning needs to be given, but
leaving open the determination as to what point in the treating process it needs to be given).
46. See Helms v. Gonzalez, 885 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App. 1994) (recognizing that the
physician had to warn the patient to discharge the duty, and in doing so was not liable to a third
party injured in an accident with the drowsy patient); see also Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at
392-99 (noting the limitations placed on the Gooden decision).
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public.47 The court reasoned that the physician had not caused the impairment
that contributed to the patient’s collision with the third person.48 Additionally,
in Praesel v. Johnson, the court held that when the patient’s knowledge of his
condition is equal to that of the physician, the physician does not owe a duty to
the public to warn the patient not to drive.49 To impose a duty on physicians
who have no informational advantage over patients would outweigh the
damages incurred by injured third persons.50
While Texas has generally adhered to the Gooden standard, some decisions
place this decision in question. Courts may only impose this duty in limited
circumstances. Since Tarasoff first created a psychologist’s duty to warn third
persons,51 cases creating a duty to warn the general public stem from similar
professional liability situations. Unlike the Tarasoff court, however, the
Supreme Court of Texas has refused to impose a duty upon mental heath care
providers.52 While many of these cases discuss Gooden, they recognize its
limits and then distinguish it from the issue being decided.53 Legislative
models have been proposed to resolve this discrepancy in Texas,54 but there
seems to be a common law tradition going against this proposed legislation.

47. See Flynn v. Houston Emergicare, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App. 1993) (relying on
language in Gooden stating that to owe a duty to the general public, the physician needs to have
gone so far in the relationship with the patient that he has begun to adversely affect the interests
of the patient).
48. See id. at 406. The dissent noted concern about holding a physician liable for not
warning a patient of medication side effects, but not holding the physician liable when he knows
of the dangers of driving under the influence of cocaine. See id. at 406-08.
49. See Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1998) (considering a patient that was
known to have epileptic seizures for many years before the accident to have a condition obvious
to the patient).
50. See id. at 398 (reasoning that while there is a benefit to warning an epileptic patient to
not drive, there is no assurance that this patient will adhere to this warning, given the patient’s
propensity for having seizures, making the benefit not comparable to the responsibility placed
upon the physician).
51. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
52. See Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at 382-83; see also Noreen M. Grant, Psychiatrists
Have No Duty to Warn Third Parties of Patients’ Threats: Tarasoff is Kicked out of Texas . . .
Finally!, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 157, 158 (2001) (congratulating the court for denying to
apply the Tarasoff doctrine to psychiatrists in Texas as held in Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d
635, 636 (Tex. 1999)).
53. See Ann Whitley Henneman, Texas Supreme Court Limits Duty of Medical
Professionals to Third Parties, 32 HOUS. LAW. 15 (1994); see, e.g., Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d
767 (Tex. 1994) (noting the great social utility in encouraging mental health professionals to
assist in examination and in diagnosis of sexually abusive patients would be eroded if a duty to
warn third parties was imposed upon such professionals); Thapar, 994 S.W.2d at 635
(considering Texas legislation, stating mental heath providers are not obligated to report potential
dangers, as an indicator of the current public policy regarding such a liability to third parties).
54. See Cantu & Hopson, supra note 21, at 402-06.
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Of the three models discussed, the Texas model provides the broadest
standard for physician liability to third parties. The physician’s duty to warn,
as articulated in Gooden, made physicians potentially liable to foreseeable
third parties injured by the actions of misinformed patients without considering
the physician’s informational advantages. More recently, however, the Texas
standard has been modified in specific circumstances to prevent physicians
from being liable when they do not have a definite informational advantage
over the patient. Moreover, when the physician does have a duty to warn, the
duty is discharged with a simple warning since the duty does not include
controlling the patient.
B.

Washington: The Driver Intervening Negligence Defense

Washington imposes a duty on physicians to foreseeable third persons, but
allows courts to limit this liability for situations where drivers are themselves
negligent. In 1965, the Supreme Court of Washington decided a case similar
to Gooden. In Kaiser v. Suburban Transportation System,55 the defendant was
a bus driver whose lapse of consciousness caused the bus to run off of the road
and crash into a telephone pole.56 The driver’s physician had prescribed the
drug Pyribenzamine for him and he took the first pill on the morning of the
accident. The court held that the physician’s liability to the plaintiff, a bus
passenger, for failing to warn the driver of the medication side effects was a
question for the jury.57
The Washington standard, which is narrower than that of Texas, includes
three issues not addressed by Texas courts. First, unlike Texas, Kaiser held
that a physician could be liable for damages if he fails to possess the skill and
knowledge usually possessed by an average member of the profession of the
locality where the physician practices.58 This standard has since been
overturned in favor of a standard of care “in the same or similar
communities.”59 Second, Kaiser introduced the possibility of mitigating the

55. Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1965). Note that the decision in
Kaiser was rendered several years before that of Tarasoff.
56. See id. at 15; see also Robert P. Giacalone, Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical
Center: The Treatment of a Third Party Plaintiff in a Medical Context, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 749,
760-61 (1989).
57. Kaiser, 398 P.2d at 15; see also Sarno, supra note 1, at 13 (characterizing this duty as
that of failure to warn the patient rather than a duty to the general driving public, since the
physician entered the suit on cross-claim by driver).
58. Kaiser, 398 P.2d at 16.
59. See Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (Wash. 1967) (en banc) (holding the
correct standard of care to be that of all similar localities). See also Fay Anne Freedman, The
Psychiatrist’s Dilemma: Protect the Public or Safeguard Individual Liberty?, 11 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 255, 272-74 (1988) (stating that another difference between Kaiser and Pederson
is that Pederson advocates a more generalized duty for physicians to protect third persons in
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physician’s negligence based on a driver’s intervening negligence.60 Even
though this was not the case in Kaiser, this case made the application of an
intervening negligence standard available to courts.61 Third, instead of
imposing a duty to protect the general driving public, Kaiser provided a limited
physician liability for failing to warn patients of potential driving impairments
caused by medications.62 Under the Washington standard, the physician must
have a clear informational advantage over the patient in order to be charged
with liability to a third party. This standard, thus, favors individual
responsibility over physician liability.
Washington caselaw provides a fairly straightforward standard for
determining when a physician’s duty to warn patients of medication side
effects is discharged. As suggested in Kaiser, if the physician has
affirmatively warned the patient of possible side effects of the administered
medication, then the physician’s duty to warn has been discharged.63 If the
patient then proceeds to drive the car, despite the physician’s warning, the
patient/driver’s duty becomes the sole issue. However, this standard leaves
undetermined the extent to which a patient’s individual duty lessens the
physician’s liability to discharge this duty to any third persons injured as a
result.
Washington’s reluctance to impose a broad, general duty upon physicians
is also evident in its failure to impose upon a health care institution a duty to
care for members of the public not involved in the traditional physician-patient
relationship.64 In Pedroza v. Bryant,65 the Washington Supreme Court held
situations beyond simply failing to warn of medication side effects when the physician has
superior knowledge of the patient’s medical condition).
60. Kaiser, 398 P.2d 14, 17 (calling this situation that of the “drugged driver”, not the
“sleeping driver”).
61. The physician argued that since the driver did not pull over after experiencing
grogginess, dry mouth and lips, his failure to warn the patient could not be the proximate cause of
the accident. See Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 18-19 (Wash. 1965).
62. While the dissent advocated imposing strict liability on drivers for injuries caused when
falling asleep, there would still be a question for the jury regarding whether the physician
exercised reasonable medical care in warning the patient of side effects. See id. at 19-23. New
York courts have held that medical providers may owe a duty of care to a patient and such
persons that “he knew or reasonably should have known were relying on him.” See Purdy v. Pub.
Adm’r of County of Westchester, 526 N.E.2d 4, 8 (N.Y. 1988) (calling Kaiser into question and
holding that physicians do not undertake a duty of care to the community at large). Additionally,
the split in jurisdictions regarding a duty extended to the general public may cause courts to be
leery of implementing the decision of Kaiser if not presented with a fact pattern specifically
suggesting such a duty. See Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d 590 (N.M. 1998).
63. See Kaiser, 398 P.2d at 19.
64. Arguably, the Kaiser decision left open the question of the physician’s duty to the
public. Thus, subsequent case law has tried to determine the correspondence between the Kaiser
line of reasoning and the potential duty to the public in such circumstances.
65. Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
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hospitals and medical facilities subject to the doctrine of corporate
negligence.66 The Pedroza decision67 limited a hospital’s duty to patients to
the time period during which such patients are within the care of the hospital.68
The court was reluctant to extend the hospital’s duty to the general public
coming in contact with the physician, because members of the general public
were not foreseeable victims.69 A limited application of this duty suggests
additional financial concerns for holding health care providers liable to the
public at large.
The Washington model, like Texas’s, provides a moderate standard
whereby physicians are liable only to foreseeable third person victims. The
standard of care for physicians is clear: that of a similar physician in the
community. More importantly, Washington limits a physician’s liability based
on intervening driver negligence. Finally, Washington gives physicians a
relatively clear standard for discharging the duty to warn patients. Physicians
simply must provide the patient with an affirmative warning. While this
standard leaves room for further development and clarification, it presents a
straightforward and balanced approach worthy of examination by Missouri
courts.
C. New Mexico: Presenting a View From the Other Side of the Line.
New Mexico provides a standard of limited physician liability to the
driving public. In an attempt to maintain the availability of quality health care,
New Mexico refrains from imposing liability on physicians except in situations
where the physician personally administered medication to a patient. New
Mexico is, therefore, one of many jurisdictions reluctant to find such a duty.70
In Lester v. Hall,71 a physician prescribed lithium for a patient five days before

66. See id. at 168-70 (stating that the doctrine of corporate negligence has been used by
courts to require that hospitals exercise a reasonable degree of care to ensure physicians hired are
competent to assume such a position).
67. In Pedroza, the hospital that was a co-defendant of the treating physician had limited the
physician’s ability to treat certain types of pregnancies. See id. at 167-68. However, this
physician treated the plaintiff’s wife in his personal office for pregnancy complications that he
would not be allowed to treat if he had seen her at the hospital. See id. As a result, her condition
necessitated treatment at the hospital, which was unable to stabilize the condition, resulting in the
woman’s death. Id. at 168.
68. See id. at 172 (holding that plaintiff could not recover from the hospital because the wife
was not subject to hospital-patient relationship at the time of alleged negligent treatment).
69. See id.
70. As in Missouri, this duty issue was only recently raised before New Mexico courts. See
Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989).
71. Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d 590 (N.M. 1998). The court considered the facts of Lester in
light of the court’s previous ruling in Wilschinsky. Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 720 (holding that
physicians owe a duty to the public who might be potentially injured by a patient if the “doctor
administered powerful drugs in his office”).
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the patient was involved in a collision.72 A factual dispute existed as to
whether the physician had warned the patient of the potential side effects of the
lithium prescription.73 Noting that it was following a substantial number of
other jurisdictions, the court declined to extend a physician duty to nonpatients when dealing with prescription situations.74
Statutorily provided health care coverage in New Mexico seriously
influenced the limitations placed on physician liability to third parties. In
1978, the New Mexico legislature limited health care liability by enacting the
Medical Malpractice Act,75 which made professional liability insurance
available to health care providers.76 This public policy has prevailed in New
Mexico and significantly influenced the court when deciding Lester. In
declining to extend a general physician duty, Lester stated that, “[t]he
Legislature has clearly demonstrated a concern for the health of the citizens of
New Mexico as it is affected by the availability of practicing physicians and
assured by the availability of malpractice insurance.”77 Even though it had the
authority to create a general duty, the court stated, in light of the Medical
Malpractice Act, “this authority must be exercised sparingly, especially when
the Legislature has spoken in a manner inconsistent with the expansion of tort
liability for health care providers.”78 After recognizing a definite split in
authorities regarding a duty to the general driving public,79 Lester held that
New Mexico’s public policy precluded extending a physician’s liability to
include a duty to the general public.80
Lester established that physicians in New Mexico are liable to third parties
only when they have a clear informational advantage over the patient. This
limitation was a change to the general duty to warn the public that existed
under Wilschinsky v. Medina.81 In Lester, one key element to finding

72. See Lester, 970 P.2d at 591.
73. Id.
74. See Nuttall, supra note 6, at 360 (noting the considerations in Lester were contradictory
to those in Wilschinsky, where the court found more compelling decisions from jurisdictions
holding a duty to third parties).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-2 (Michie 1978).
76. See Lester, 970 P.2d at 593 (reiterating the deference given to legislatures to codify
public policy concerns). In further attempting to limit potential liability for physicians, a shorter
three-year statute of limitations is imposed for medical malpractice rather than for general
negligence claims. See Nuttall, supra note 6, at 359.
77. Lester, 970 P.2d at 593.
78. Id. at 593-94.
79. See id. at 596-97 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) (finding the Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. 1998), decision to be more favorable to the present situation than that of Gooden, thus
calling into question the Gooden decision, which imposed a duty to the general driving public).
80. Lester, 970 P.2d at 595.
81. See id. at 595 (stating that the decision in Wilschinsky is a narrow exception to the
general rule that physicians do now owe a duty to the non-patient public).
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physician liability was whether the medication was administered in the
presence of a physician or was prescribed to the patient and taken on his own.82
Therefore, the amount of control that a physician has over the administration of
the medication will affect his liability.83 When giving a patient medication
while in his office, a physician is obligated to guard against any foreseeable
danger the patient could create after leaving the office and driving his car.84
This duty could be discharged, however, by warning the patient of the
medication’s potential impairments.85 In New Mexico, the dividing line for
imposing a duty to the general driving public depends on how the patient
receives medication. This standard is much narrower than the standard of
either Texas or Washington.
One issue left unresolved by New Mexico may cause concern for
physicians practicing within the state.86 While the purpose of the Medical
Malpractice Act is to limit physician liability, doctors are not given much
leeway in deciding whether to treat an in-office patient with a shot of
medication that is not a narcotic.87 While such uncertainty is likely to cause
unrest within the medical and professional communities,88 it does place a
greater burden on individual patients to be responsible, rather than
automatically imposing the duty on physicians.

82. See id. at 592-93 (differentiating between the prescription situation presented in Lester
and the administration of a narcotic shot in Wilschinsky).
83. Compare Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 715 (stating that a difference existed between the
doctor having control over situations arising within his offices and under the administration of
powerful narcotics and having control physically over the patient), with Gooden v. Tips, 651
S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1983). See also Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 214 F.3d 1175,
1181-82 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding, as an extension of the Wilschinsky ruling, that New Mexico
will continue to find that outpatient relationships with physicians do not present situations where
physicians have a duty to control patients, due to the lack of opportunity for physicians to monitor
patients in that type of setting).
84. See Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 717 (concluding that reasonableness includes a duty to
warn the general driving public when the patient is given a driving impairing medication); see
also Hoover’s Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
(implementing a similar public policy factor analysis to impose a duty on manufacturers of a
milking machine who failed to warn consumers of electric volt surges).
85. See Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 718 (stating that options for safeguarding patients include
explaining to the patient that he would need to stay under observation until able to drive and
withholding an injection until another means of transportation arrives). The court’s consideration
here, while expressly limiting the duty being imposed to a set of individuals potentially affected
by the patient while driving, seems to imply that the physician should assume some control over
the behavior of the patient. Cf. Gooden, 651 S.W.2d at 370 (stating expressly that a physician
does not need to assert control over the patient).
86. See Nuttall, supra note 6, at 361.
87. See id. at 360-61.
88. See id.
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New Mexico courts have limited a physician’s duty to warn to situations
where the physician has an informational advantage over the patient. This
occurs when a physician personally administered medication to a patient in his
office. In this situation, simply warning the patient before he leaves the office
would discharge the physician’s duty. Applying this limited standard furthers
New Mexico’s policy of providing quality uniform health care to individuals as
mandated by the Medical Malpractice Act. The New Mexico standard
advocates finding physicians not liable when prescribing medications to be
taken outside the office and control of the physician.
IV. MISSOURI’S DUTY TO WARN
Missouri has traditionally imposed duties upon physicians.89 Missouri
caselaw, however, does not establish a clear standard for physician liability to
the general public for failure to warn of medication side effects. By
contemplating and implementing standards from other jurisdictions, such as
the three models discussed previously, Missouri can clarify this ambiguity.
Missouri’s precedent, though ambiguous, does indicate that physicians in
Missouri have always owed a duty to patients. Making physicians liable to
injured third parties for failing to warn patients of side effects could be a
natural extension of this original duty. However, a historical consideration of a
physician’s duty in Missouri challenges this natural extension argument,
because Missouri physicians have not held an absolute duty to the general
public. Even though the concept of duty in Missouri has evolved considerably
over the past several decades, it remains a potentially expansive doctrine.90
A.

Expanding the Traditional Physician Duty to Patients

Missouri physicians possess a traditional duty to patients. For such a duty
to extend to a specific patient, the parties must have a legal relationship.91 This
physician-patient relationship is necessary for the pursuit of a medical
malpractice claim.92 As Missouri law defines it, the physician-patient
relationship is a “consensual relationship where the patient or someone acting
on the patient’s behalf knowingly employs a physician who consents to treat

89. For a general discussion of the legal evolution of the application of duty in Missouri, see
David. C. Kneiriem, Exploding the Firecracker: Duty in Missouri, 53 J. MO. B. 9 (1997).
90. See id. at 9 (discussing the difficulty Missouri courts may face when confronted with
new types of duty cases, including duty to warn cases).
91. See Hoover’s Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Mo.
1985) (en banc); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 46-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
92. See Richardson v. Rohrbaugh, 857 S.W.2d 415, 417-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(determining that there was no physician-patient relationship present between the mother of a
newborn baby and the neurologist who failed to diagnose a genetic medical condition that
warranted bringing a medical malpractice claim); Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 49.
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the patient.”93 In this relationship, a physician has an informational advantage
over the patient that enables him to make an educated decision regarding the
patient’s medical treatment. Missouri caselaw states that in most situations a
physician-patient relationship begins when the physician personally examines
the patient.94 These decisions indicate that this relationship is contractual in
nature.95 Thus, when a physician acts within his capacity to treat a patient, he
establishes a physician-patient relationship. The existence of a physicianpatient relationship is necessary to extend a physician’s duty from his patient
to third parties at risk of being injured by the patient.96
Missouri has previously found only that psychotherapists owe a duty to a
foreseeable victim if a “special relationship” exists with the patient. Generally,
a physician is not required to control the conduct of a person even if he may
cause foreseeable harm.97 Nevertheless, Missouri courts, following Tarasoff,
have recognized that a duty to control may arise when a “special relationship”
exists between the parties.98 As in Tarasoff, however, Missouri courts have

93. Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 49.
94. See id. at 50 (noting that other jurisdictions have recognized a physician-patient
relationship to exist without any personal contact, “where the consultant physician does not
physically examine or bill the patient . . . [but where] . . . the physician is contractually obligated
to provide assistance in the patient’s diagnosis or treatment and does so”) (quoting Corbet v.
McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
95. See id. at 171 (holding that being contacted by emergency room physician to provide
advice for outpatient, but never speaking to or examining patient did not create a physicianpatient relationship that would impose a liability).
96. A plaintiff pursuing a third party claim against a physician may have another potential
defendant if courts find that hospitals also hold a potentially expansive duty to patients. The
hospital itself may also be liable to patients if it does not meet a certain standard of care.
According to Missouri law, a hospital owes a duty of reasonable care to all of its patients, which
is separate from the duty of the physician. See Poluski v. Richardson Transp., 877 S.W.2d 709,
713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that if the conduct is administrative, ministerial or routine in
caring for the patient, the standard is that of ordinary care owed to the patient); Stacy v. Truman
Medical Ctr., 836 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). If this duty arises, then there is a
possibility that the hospital could also owe a duty to warn the general public, if the physician in a
similar situation would be held liable for breach of this duty. After finding the hospital to have an
informational advantage over the patient, Missouri case law has held that the duty of reasonable
care exists until the patient is either officially discharged, meaning signing the discharge
paperwork, or until the patient physically leaves the premises. See Poluski, 877 S.W.2d at 71314.
97. But see Kuhn v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 876 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that rental car company had a duty to a third person to control the intoxicated off-duty employee
from driving one of its owned vehicles, which struck the third person’s vehicle and killed the
driver).
98. See Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Timothy E. Gammon &
John K. Hulston, The Duty of Mental Health Care Providers to Restrain Their Patients or Warn
Third Parties, 60 MO. L. REV. 749, 766 (1995) (stating that a recognized exception to the rule
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found this special relationship to exist primarily only between psychotherapists
and their patients.99 In such a relationship, the therapist has a duty to warn an
identifiable third party victim.100 Recent decisions have therefore limited a
physician’s duty to warn to potential victims, rather than extending a duty to
warn to all third persons.101 Outside of this special relationship,102 a physician
may owe a duty to third persons depending on the special circumstances of the
case and the dangerous conditions facing the third party.103 Consequently,
outside of a psychotherapist-patient relationship, special circumstances must be
present to impose upon a physician a duty to warn. However, even under
special circumstances, there is no duty to control.
B.

Discharging the Physician Duty Owed to Patients and Preventing
Potential Expansion

Once established, the physician’s duty to a patient continues until the
physician-patient relationship ends.104 After the relationship has ended, the
physician no longer has an informational advantage over the patient, and the
duty to the patient has been discharged. As a result, the physician should no
longer owe a duty to the public with whom the patient comes in contact.105
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently established a four-factor test in Weiss

that a person has no duty to control the actions of another is the creation of a “special
relationship”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 315 (1963-64).
99. See Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 311 (noting that other situations imposing a “special
relationship” between the parties include dealings of innkeeper-guest relationships, common
carrier-passenger relationships, school-student relationships, and potentially employee-employer
relationships) (quoting R.C. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 759 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988)).
100. See id. at 306-07 (following the Tarasoff line of reasoning).
101. See id. at 312 n.7; Gammon & Hulston, supra note 99, at 767 (stating that generally
courts in Missouri “have been loathe to impose liability for a defendant’s failure to control a third
party’s actions”).
102. This Comment will argue that the existence of this special relationship indicates that the
potentially liable party has had an opportunity to know or should have known the mental status of
the individual due to the nature of the relationship or the treatment environment under which the
relationship operates.
103. See Kuhn, 876 S.W.2d at 673; Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 311-12. The creation of this duty
is a version of the foreseeability of harm argument that imposes upon the defendant a duty to
warn.
104. See Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 52.
105. This consideration should be contingent upon the type of treatment needed by the
patient. For example, if the patient is in need of long term or chronic care, then these factors
would not be reasonably applicable to the discussion of the relationship ending upon meeting one
of the factors propounded by Weiss. This results from the original purpose of the discussion of
the duty to warn, which is that the physician has some relationship with his patient. If there was
no relationship in which the physician was capable of either prescribing medication or
administering such, then the duty to warn would not even be an issue.
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v. Rojanasathit (hereinafter the “Weiss test”) to be used when determining the
end of a physician-patient relationship.106 The factors of the Weiss test
include: “(1) the mutual consent of the parties, (2) the physician’s withdrawal
after reasonable notice, (3) the dismissal of the physician by the patient, or (4)
the cessation of the necessity that gave rise to the relationship.”107 If a
physician meets any of these factors, he no longer has a duty to the patient.
The physician may still be liable for not discharging his duty to warn while in
the relationship—otherwise he would not have any potential duty beyond the
termination of the relationship.
Missouri courts have applied this four-factor test to situations involving
emergency treatment. For example, Missouri courts have held that upon
completion of an emergency surgery, the physician-patient relationship ended
pursuant to the fourth factor of the “Weiss test.”108 The physician only had a
duty to warn the patient of a medication side effect prior to the termination of
the relationship, while he had an informational advantage over the patient. If
any of the Weiss factors are met, then the relationship has arguably ended and
the duty should not be extended to third parties.
C. Reliance on Principles of Public Policy
Because Missouri has a public policy favoring a common law duty to
warn, it is likely that it will move towards finding physicians liable to third
persons for failing to warn patients of medication side effects. Courts often
consider public policy when making decisions. Missouri has adopted a sixfactor public policy analysis to be used in finding a duty to warn.109 The
public policy factors include: (1) the social consensus that the interest is
worthy of protection; (2) the foreseeability of harm and the degree of certainty
that the protected person suffered injury; (3) moral blame attached to the
conduct by society; (4) the extent to which the conduct could prevent future
harm; (5) the potential cost and the ability to spread the risk of loss; and (6) the
economic burden placed on the actor and the community that may be

106. See Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 119-20 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
107. Id. at 199-20; see also Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 522. The application of these factors in
Weiss was specifically adapted to discuss the running of the statute of limitations and the
continuing care exception for medical malpractice cases, but it was also used to address the issue
of treatment in an emergency room in Millard.
108. See Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 52-53 (remanding and holding that if the trial court found a
physician-patient relationship to exist that the relationship had ended three hours after patient’s
arrival at emergency room, when she received emergency surgery).
109. See id. at 47 (holding that Missouri courts are guided by the factors presented by
Hoover’s Dairy to find a duty when no special relationship exists between the parties); Bradley,
904 S.W.2d at 310; Hoover’s Dairy, 700 S.W.2d at 432 (stating that these factors are the basis for
sound public policy).
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affected.110 All of these factors are considered together as a collective social
policy of the Missouri legislature.111 If imposing a duty is supported under
these factors then neither actual nor constructive knowledge will be
necessary.112 Missouri courts will likely use these factors to make future
decisions regarding physician liability to third parties for failure to warn of
medication side effects. Driving-related accidents may affect any member of
the general public.
Since legislatures are usually in the best position to evaluate and
implement public policy, the Missouri legislature’s stance regarding a
physician’s liability to third parties will help determine the state’s policy. The
Missouri legislature has drafted and passed several statutes specifically
addressing a professional’s duty to warn others.113 For example, the Child
Abuse Reporting Act114 requires a psychologist to report to the proper
authorities when he believes that a child has been or will be subjected to
abuse.115 In Bradley v. Ray,116 the court stated that physicians who are told of
such abuse by their patients or who have reason to know that a child will be
abused should report such violence.117 In these situations, physicians have an
informational advantage not over the patient, but over the patient’s potential
victim. Therefore, reporting the potential abuse is the only way a physician
can discharge his duty.
A psychologist’s duty to report situations of child abuse is unique based on
the “special relationship” that exists between the patient and the physician.
The policy underlying this duty is relevant, though, in discussing a physician’s
duty to third parties not within the physician’s immediate control.118 In
110. See Hoover’s Dairy, 700 S.W.2d at 432.
111. See Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 47 (stating that the legislature is a political body that for the
most part bases its decision on public sentiment inherent in these public policy factors and
holding that the statute regarding “on call” emergency physicians represented the social
consensus).
112. See Hoover’s Dairy, 700 S.W.2d at 432.
113. See Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 305-06. Missouri has specifically created a duty of the
physician to warn third persons of the HIV status of their patients. See MO. REV. STAT. §
191.653(3) (2000 & Supp. 2001) (stating that physicians are under a duty to report to the
Department of Health any patients that are infected with HIV); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.656(2)
(2000 & Supp. 2001) (stating that physicians are not liable for disclosing confidential information
to warn spouses or care givers of the patient’s HIV status).
114. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115(1) (2000 & Supp. 2001). This Act states: “When any . . .
psychologist, . . . has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or may be subjected to
abuse or neglect or observe a child being subjected to conditions or circumstances which would
reasonably result in abuse or neglect, that person shall immediately report or cause a report to be
made to the division . . . .”
115. See id.
116. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
117. See id. at 310.
118. See Gammon & Hulston, supra note 99, at 765.
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Bradley, the court severely limited the potential duty owed by the physician.
In light of the statute,119 the court did not create any additional common law
duties.120 Rather, the court recognized an injured party’s right to bring an
action “only for failure to warn of specific risks of future harm to readily
identifiable victims.”121 The specific acts or omissions of the physician must
foreseeably cause either harm or injury to a third party that the patient
encounters.122 Thus, a psychologist’s duty to warn only exists when the victim
is foreseeable.
Because the Bradley court did not impose upon treating physicians the
same duty owed by psychologists, the decision left several questions
unanswered. Bradley restricted the psychologist’s duty to a duty to warn, not
to control.123 Thus far, Missouri has adopted and enforced a duty to warn on
psychologists only, as in Bradley, but has left open the question of a
physician’s duty to third parties. Missouri, however, has demonstrated some
interest in creating such a common law duty upon other physicians. The
holding of Bradley provides a good example of how public policy influences
judicial decisions in Missouri. Yet, without a statute to rely upon, courts must
independently decide Missouri’s public policy.
D. Two Important Exceptions to Traditional Duties in Missouri
Missouri courts have crafted two exceptions to the traditional duties
imposed on physicians. They have limited the physician’s duty to his patient
when danger is open and obvious to the patient. In these cases, the physician
would not owe a duty to the public. In addition, they have limited the
physician’s duty to the general public when imposing such a duty would
violate the personal freedom of the patient. In both situations, the
informational advantage of the physician is considered equal to or less than the
patient’s. Missouri courts have considerable room for interpretation and
application of traditional duties, which may present a dilemma for the courts
when ruling on the physician’s duty to warn.

119. Consider the difference between circumstances presented in Bradley, where a statute
already existed, with the situation typically presented in duty to warn cases, where the duty has
typically been developed by common law and then later imposed in the form of statutory law.
120. See Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 311.
121. See id.
122. See id. (quoting Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo.
1988) (en banc)).
123. See Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 312 (stating that a psychologist now has a duty under the
common law of Missouri to warn the intended victim, which includes notifying proper officials,
but not to control the patient’s actions). See also Gammon & Hulston, supra note 99, at 765
(drawing attention to the open questions that Bradley left for future Missouri cases, including
under what circumstances physicians will be adjudged to have discharged their duty).
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Open and Obvious Dangers

A physician that does not have an informational advantage over a patient
may not owe a duty to the patient. For example, warning a patient may not be
required when the danger is open and obvious or commonly known to the
patient, even though a physician-patient relationship exists. Consequently,
when presented with a case factually similar to both Gooden and Kaiser,
Missouri courts did not find that the physician owed a duty to a third party.124
In Young v. Wadsworth, the plaintiff claimed that the physician failed to warn
his patient not to drive when taking Xanax.125 The patient experienced a
blackout spell while driving, causing the driver to crash into the vehicle of the
plaintiff, killing the driver.126 The court addressed only the issue of proximate
cause necessary to find a duty owed by the driver for the injuries incurred.127
The court found that the physician was under no duty to warn because the
driver suffered blackouts before the medication was prescribed and because
there was no evidence that the patient had taken any medication before the
accident.128 For this reason, the physician in Young did not have an
informational advantage over the patient nor a duty to warn patient.
Young reveals Missouri’s judicial hesitation to assert two important
standards, each of which could impose a duty on physicians to third parties for
failing to warn patients of medication side effects. First, Young provides that
regardless of the doctor’s traditional duty, a physician has no duty to warn of
dangers that are open and obvious to the patient.129 Second, the court in Young
refused to extend a duty to third persons for failing to warn the patient not to
drive.130 While Young does not indicate when physicians would be liable to

124. See Young v. Wadsworth, 916 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
125. Id. at 878.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 879 (acknowledging but declining to extend the decisions of Gooden and
Kaiser to the present situation, stating that none of the factual scenarios in those cases were
present).
129. This proposition comes from a line of Missouri products liability cases. See Richardson
v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Grady v. Am. Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d
911, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
130. In Young, the court distinguished this situation from three types of situations where other
courts had held a physician liable to a third party under a failure to warn theory; where the doctor
actually created the conditions and then failed to warn the patient, where the doctor knew that the
patient had an unknown physical condition that could result in the cause of an accident and failed
to warn him, and where the doctor advised the patient to continue to drive. See Young, 916
S.W.2d at 879. While these situations do not seem to be all that contradictory or distinguishable
from the situation presented in Young, the court implied that to be held liable, a physician must
possess a higher level of knowledge about a patient’s condition than the patient does. See id. at
878-79. Arguably, the court was simply hesitant to apply such a standard upon physicians in
Missouri.
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third parties, physician liability to third parties should not exist unless the
physician has a clear informational advantage over his patient.
2.

Denial of Extension of Duty in Favor of Personal Freedom

Missouri courts have limited the doctor’s duty to warn if doing so violates
a patient’s personal freedoms. The decision in Bradley was unique because the
court declined to extend a duty to warn in cases both prior to and
contemporaneous with it.131 Adopting Tarasoff’s reasoning, Missouri courts
previously distinguished between warning an identifiable victim and warning
the general public.132 The courts differentiated the facts of these cases from
Tarasoff, which enabled them to avoid accepting the doctrine at that point.
While Missouri’s public policy supports the sanctity of a patient’s
individual freedom, it may support extending a physicians’ duty to the general
public. After the court applies the Hoover’s Dairy public policy factors, the
social consensus may seem to favor imposing a duty. However, imposing a
duty on the physician may also work contrary to Missouri’s public policy,
which favors personal liberty.133 In Sherrill v. Wilson, the Missouri Surpreme
Court held that imposing a duty would be inappropriate in light of the public
interest.134 In Sherrill, the court addressed whether treating physicians owed a
duty to the general public when deciding which involuntary patients should be
released on pass.135 The court held that patients must be kept in the least
restrictive means possible if found to qualify for involuntary confinement.136
Physicians should be given deference in making decisions about their patients’

131. See Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 309-10 (noting that previous decisions had declined to
address the issue of whether Missouri would follow the reasoning imposed by the Tarasoff
legacy, but that the present case allowed the court to decide such an issue).
132. See Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Sherrill v. Wilson, 653
S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
133. See Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664. Recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District rendered a decision regarding physician liability for driving-related impairments
that reinforced the holdings of both Matt and Sherrill. See Virgin v. Hopewell Center, No. ED
78857, 2001 WL 1155854, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2001). The court specifically stated that
where a patient is not committed to a facility, Missouri law would not allow for the court to find
that the physician had a duty to warn motorists and to take precautionary steps to reduce any risk
that a patient may pose to these motorists. See id. Even though the driver in Virgin was a
psychiatric patient, this decision seems to show the hesitancy of Missouri courts to hold
physicians liable for driving-related accidents, because the potential victims are unforeseeable.
See id. Additionally, the court in Virgin noted the status of Robinson, and while following the
same case law considered by the court in Robinson, found instead that no duty existed under the
current status of Missouri law. See id. at *3.
134. See Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664; Gammon & Hulston, supra note 99, at 756-57.
135. See Sherrill, 653 S.W.2d at 664 (stating that involuntary patients may be confined in
mental hospitals if they are judicially determined to be a threat to themselves or to the public).
136. See id.
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best interests.137 However, imposing a greater burden on the physician, such as
a duty to the general public, could pressure physicians to provide restrictive
treatment to their patients, even if their best judgment would dictate
otherwise.138 If imposed with additional liability, physicians may seek to
protect their own interests rather than provide the best treatment for their
patients. For example, in Sherrill, the Missouri Supreme Court found that
public policy actually advocated not holding patients against their own will.139
Thus, Missouri courts have been reluctant to extend a duty to the general
public regarding the release of involuntary patients, indicating Missouri’s
public policy in favor of individual freedom. But, if held liable to the general
public, physicians may not be willing to release such patients for fear of being
held personally liable for their patients’ actions.
Missouri courts have issued similar decisions regarding treatment of
voluntary patients, in either an emergency room or outpatient setting. Courts
note distinctions in duties owed to patients depending on their treatment status.
In Matt v. Burrell, the court stated “a duty with respect to the acts of a
voluntary outpatient is less than that owed with respect to a voluntary inpatient,
and the heaviest duty is imposed with respect to a person who has been
involuntarily committed.”140 In Matt, a patient presented herself to the
community psychiatric rehabilitation center, where she had been a patient for
several years. The patient stated her intent to leave the facility and kill herself
by wrecking her car.141 Even though the physicians did not stop the patient
from leaving, they were not liable to the third party hit and killed by the
patient.142 This decision followed Sherrill’s failure to extend a physician’s
duty to the general public. Again, Missouri’s public policy acted as a restraint
against requiring a physician to control a patient by preventing her from
leaving. Certain acts are beyond traditional duties owed by physicians.
Both Sherrill and Matt urged physicians to respect their patients’ personal
freedom. However, both cases failed to address several important issues
137. See id. (stating that physicians may have thought that releasing the patient for a period of
time was beneficial to his treatment).
138. See id.
139. See id. at 669 (recognizing that this decision is not meant to overturn any previous
decisions which held physicians or public officers liable under a failure to warn theory if the
victim was an identifiable individual rather than the general public). Instead of relying on the
Tarasoff legacy, as the decision in Bradley did, the Sherrill court relied upon the reasoning of
Thompson v. County of Alameda, which is considered the counterpart of Tarasoff. See Thompson
v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
140. Matt v. Burrell, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
141. Id. at 798.
142. See id. at 797-98. Note the difference in the degree of the relationship in this situation,
where the physicians had an ongoing relationship with the patient prior to her presentation at the
clinic on the day of the accident, and in an emergency room situation, where it is very likely that
the physician had not treated the patient prior to the time when treatment began.
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regarding a standard for physician liability to third parties. First, these cases
do not establish the required informational advantage a physician must have
over the patient to impose a duty to third parties. Furthermore, while these two
cases advocated not holding patients against their will, they did not discuss a
similar policy when medication was involved. Lastly, since physicians do not
owe a public duty to keep patients from leaving, there is no standard
addressing how a physician’s duty could be discharged. Nevertheless, since
both Sherrill and Matt did not obligate physicians to control their patients’
behavior, issuing a simple warning would most likely discharge any duty
found. Addressing these issues is important when deciding whether a
physician is liable to third parties.
E.

Application of Missouri’s Evolving Duty to Warn in Robinson v. Health
Midwest Development Group

In Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group,143 the Missouri
Supreme Court had an opportunity to adjudicate an issue other jurisdictions
have grappled with for decades. Robinson presents the only written144 analysis
of the duty to warn for Missouri, even though the court failed to create an
identifiable standard. In advocating the position Missouri courts should take,
Robinson may serve as a predictor of where this area of Missouri law is
headed. The court of appeals decision, which was dismissed by the supreme
court, provides the only interpretation of Missouri’s public policy regarding
physician liability to third parties. Even though it was dismissed, this decision
is important because setting a third person liability standard for physicians will
reshape individual duties for Missouri citizens who are ultimately the patients.
Since the same issues will almost certainly come before Missouri courts again,
the Robinson decisions frame the approach Missouri courts will likely take in
the future.
Despite its unique facts, Robinson provides a good starting point for
discussing physician liability to third persons. In Robinson, Driver Schmidt
arrived at the Lafayette Regional Heath Center emergency room during the
afternoon of November 17, 1993, seeking medication to help calm her
nerves.145 A physician examined Schmidt and ordered Compazine, a nonnarcotic drug used to treat nausea, to be given intravenously to her.146
Allegedly, neither the physician nor the staff nurse warned Schmidt of

143. See Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, 58 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. 2001) (en banc).
144. See id. (dismissing the issues decided by the court of appeals and affirming the trial
court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendants).
145. See id. at 521.
146. See id.
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potential side effects of this medication, which included drowsiness, dizziness
and lowered blood pressure.147
Thirty-five minutes after receiving this medication through injection,
Schmidt left the emergency room and attempted to drive her vehicle.148
Because of her abrupt and unknown departure, the staff did not properly
discharge her from the emergency room. Approximately ten minutes after
leaving the emergency room, Schmidt lost control of her vehicle, crossed the
centerline and collided with Plaintiff Robinson’s vehicle.149 The Missouri
Highway Patrol Report noted that Robinson’s attempt to stop her vehicle and
avoid the collision resulted in twenty-one feet of braking tire marks.150
Plaintiff Robinson suffered injuries as a result of the collision and initiated a
lawsuit against Health Midwest Development Group.
While the cause of the accident was not stated, certain factors make
Schmidt’s physical condition at the time of the accident questionable. Officers
found an empty beer container in Schmidt’s vehicle upon investigating the
accident scene.151 Moreover, Schmidt admitted to consuming alcohol prior to
the accident.152
Robinson went to trial in July of 1999, but the jury was unable to reach a
decision.153 Before Robinson was reset for a new trial, Defendant Health
Midwest Development Group filed a motion for summary judgment.154 The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on February
15, 2000, holding that it did not owe a duty to Robinson as a member of the
public. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision and requested that
summary judgment be overturned. The court of appeals granted the plaintiff’s
request and remanded this case to the trial court with the instruction that the

147. See id. (stating that these side effects were generally known in the medical community to
be associated with Compazine). Respondent’s brief noted that Schmidt told the nurse that
someone was with her at the emergency room that would be able to drive her home. See
Respondent’s Brief at 4, Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, 58 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. 2001)
(No. 83645), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf. The court’s decision does
not mention or address this fact.
148. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *1.
149. See id. at *1-2.
150. See Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, 2001 WL 212776, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
March 5, 2001).
151. See id.; Respondent’s Brief at 5, Robinson, (No. 83645), available at
http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf.
152. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *2.
153. See id.; Respondent’s Brief at 5, Robinson, (No. 83645), available at
http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf. Consider the implications for a trial case when
reasonable people in the position of the jurors cannot come to a logical conclusion given a set of
facts. This seems indicative of the split decisions that jurisdictions have rendered when presented
with a similar fact pattern.
154. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *2.
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physician could be liable to the general public when failing to warn a patient of
the side effects of an administered medication.155 The cause was ordered
transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court at the request of the defendant on
June 26, 2001.
The Missouri Supreme Court handed down its decision in Robinson on
October 23, 2001.156 The decision adds little to the current analysis of a
physician’s duty to third parties regarding warning of medication side effects.
The court decided under which statute, for purposes of the statute of
limitations, a case such as Robinson would fall, but it declined to rule on the
substantive issue presented in Robinson. One of many possible reasons for this
could be that this case was time-barred.
The one important clarification that Robinson provided was that the statute
of limitations in Missouri for claims against health care providers is two
years,157 rather than the five-year statute of limitations allowed for general
negligence claims.158 Thus, regardless of whether Robinson’s claim was
brought against the physicians or against the hospital, the court believed that
such claims needed to be filed within two years. The court used this statute in
Robinson because the statute listed particular defendants who fall under this
two-year umbrella.159 This interpretation must stand given the clear and

155. See id. at *18. The court of appeals limited prior Missouri case law to a specific
application of the facts. For example, the court of appeals discounted the broader principle stated
in Sherrill, that in the interest of personal liberties and in deference to the decisions of treating
physicians, a general duty owed by physicians should not be imposed for releasing an involuntary
patient. See supra notes 131-37; Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, 2001 WL 212776, at
*7-8 (Mo. Ct. App. March 5, 2001). Instead, the court stated the belief that the decision in
Sherrill should only be limited to medical decisions rendered by the standard regarding whether
the patient should be released. See id. The court of appeals similarly limited the decision of
Young to provide a statement of whether the side effects of the medication administered should
have been open and obvious to the patient. See id. at * 8; supra notes 122-27. However, the open
and obvious danger in the situation of Robinson may not have been the medication’s side effect,
but the disputed circumstantial facts of the intoxication of the patient upon entering the
emergency room. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *8. Such a standard would hinder the
general principle advocated by Missouri that courts should be hesitant to impose upon physicians
a duty to warn the general public.
156. Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group, 58 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. 2001) (en banc).
157. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (West 2000) (stating that any claim regarding the care,
custody or treatment of a patient falls within the provisions of this statute). This statute provides
that “all actions against physicians, hospitals . . . pharmacists . . . and any other entity providing
health care services and all employees . . . acting in the course and scope of their employment, for
damages for malpractice, negligence . . . shall be brought within two years from the date of
occurrence.” See id. Robinson’s claim was filed slightly more than three years after the time of
the incident. See Robinson, 58 S.W.3d at 521.
158. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (West 2000) (applying to general negligence claims against
those defendants that do not fall into the aforementioned statute).
159. See Robinson, 58 S.W.3d at 522.
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unambiguous language of the statute.160 After Robinson, the one guarantee
provided to both physicians and potential plaintiffs is that the claim needs to be
filed within two years of the incident.
Missouri courts will have to further clarify many issues Robinson did not
provide clear answers about. No definitive answer was provided for whether
Missouri would find a duty to warn in medical malpractice or general
negligence suits.161 Based on the statute’s wording, however, practitioners do
know that a two-year statute of limitations applies to both medical malpractice
and negligence claims.162 The court of appeals found Missouri’s public policy
to support imposing physician liability to third persons with driving related
accidents. While Robinson was perhaps just not the right case to force the
court to decide this issue, the court of appeals decisions may be followed in the
future.
VI. MISSOURI’S PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA: ADDITIONAL DUTIES OR
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Missouri’s public policy, which favors imposing liability and additional
duties upon physicians, will influence the adoption of a third party liability
standard for failing to warn of medication side effects. Three general policies
have developed in Missouri that explain the controversy between imposing
additional duties upon physicians and holding individuals responsible for their
own actions: the learned intermediary doctrine, the informed consent doctrine
and the stigma attached to driving while intoxicated. Intertwined with these
three issues are two considerations also addressed by the other jurisdictions
discussed. When the physician has an informational advantage over the
patient, placing the duty to warn on the physician may be justified. Still, the
patient’s knowledge about his personal physical conditions may cause him to
be responsible despite the physician’s failure to warn. If the physician does
owe a duty, the court must determine what warning would discharge the duty.
Even though Missouri imposes traditional duties on physicians, the
concept of duty in Missouri is constantly changing as new situations arise for
adjudication. Missouri courts may be driving in the direction of imposing
greater rather than lesser duties upon Missouri physicians, especially regarding
the administration of medications.163 Missouri has a strong interest in
160. See id.
161. The importance of this distinction regards the relationship that would be needed to bring
a claim against a physician. If regarded as a medical malpractice claim, plaintiff drivers do not
fall into a physician-patient relationship. However, if allowed to fall under a general negligence
heading, public policy factors may possibly allow for the duty to be extended to the general
public.
162. See Robinson, 58 S.W.3d at 522.
163. As noted before, the only decision rendered in Missouri regarding physician liability to
third parties was given in Robinson. In rendering its decision, the court of appeals seemed to be
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protecting drivers on its roadways. However, the judiciary should not be so
quick to re-allocate the responsibility of safe driving from the individual to the
physician. Based on Missouri’s case law and applicable public policy issues,
Missouri courts should adopt a simple duty to warn standard that requires them
to warn patients.
A.

The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Burden Shifting

The learned intermediary doctrine, adopted by Missouri, requires
physicians to maintain an informational advantage over patients regarding
knowledge about medications. This doctrine essentially provides a defense to
drug companies or manufacturers when charged with negligent manufacturing
of their products.164 Numerous public policy considerations form the basis of
the learned intermediary doctrine.165 In applying this doctrine, the physician
acts as a learned intermediary between the drug manufacturer and the
consumer, who is ultimately the physician’s patient.166 The physician’s
warning about the potential side effects of certain medications has the same
effect as if the manufacturer were personally warning the patient, which shifts
the burden to the physician.167 The primary rationale behind this doctrine is
that the physician is in a better position than the manufacturer to reach the
patient.168 Additionally, the potential side effects are often so complicated that
patients may actually understand the dangers better if the physician is the one
explaining them.169 Thus, Missouri courts determined the physician to be in
the best position to warn of the potential medication side effects.
The physician may be liable for not warning the patient even if the drug
manufacturer failed to warn the physician.170 Thus, the physician’s duty to

most closely following the reasoning applied by the courts in Texas, which applies a very broad
duty to warn standard. See supra notes 35-52.
164. Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer
Advertising, 65 MO. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (2000). Missouri applied the doctrine of learned
intermediary for one of the first times in a 1967 Missouri Supreme Court decision. See Krug v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 151-52 (Mo. 1967) (stating that when a physician is
properly warned of potential side effects there is a greater possibility that the patient will not be
subject to injuries as a result).
165. See Lear, supra note 168, at 1104-05.
166. See Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
167. See id.
168. See Lear, supra note 168, at 1115. Missouri caselaw states that the reasoning behind this
doctrine is that “a patient may obtain the product only through a qualified professional who
presumably will explain the dangers of the product to the patient.” See Menschik v. Mid-America
Pipeline Co., 812 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
169. See Lear, supra note 168, at 1115.
170. See Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Mo. 1993) (resolving
the issue left unanswered by the court in Sterling Drug regarding a physician’s liability when the
pharmaceutical company failed to warn the physician and holding that as long as the physician
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warn the patient goes beyond simply informing the patient about the side
effects.171 A physician has a professional duty to keep abreast of all current
medical developments.172 The physician could therefore be liable if he knew
or reasonably should have known of current medical developments regarding
the medication, but did not tell the patient.173 Because Missouri wants to
impose a greater burden upon physicians, courts do not want to create an
exception to this doctrine for direct-to-consumer advertising.174 This exception
would mitigate the physician’s duty and place the burden back on the
manufacturers who are doing the direct advertising.175 By not recognizing this
exception,176 Missouri continues to impose a heightened duty on physicians,
suggesting that it may rule in favor of extending a duty to the general public if
the physician does not issue a warning and the patient harms someone as a
result.
B.

Informed Consent Doctrine—A Fully Informed Patient

The informed consent doctrine compliments Missouri’s learned
intermediary doctrine by advocating that patients be aware of all of the
potential dangers of a treatment before the procedure is performed. Thus, the
standard used to determine if the patient did not have informed consent before
undertaking the procedure is “whether a reasonable person in plaintiff’s
position would have consented to the procedure had the proper disclosure been
made.”177 When bringing an action for lack of informed consent, the injured
patient has the burden of proving that a fully informed reasonable person
would not have consented to the procedure.178 By disclosing all information to
already knew or had information regarding potential future injuries to the patient, then a failure to
warn the physician could not have been the proximate cause of the injuries); Doe, 3 S.W.3d at
420.
171. See Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
172. See id.
173. See id. (holding that the physician kept informed of the potential transmission of AIDS
through blood and blood products and spoke with other physicians, but failed to give the patients
the warnings and continued to use the potentially infected products, should have done so and took
the liability off of the manufacturer).
174. See Lear, supra note 166, at 1116.
175. See id. (arguing that Missouri should allow for this exception because by participating in
direct-to-consumer advertising, the manufacturers are negating the principles for which the
learned intermediary doctrine is imposed and assuming that patients will be able to understand the
side effects on their own).
176. See id. (discussing concern about continuing to impose this duty on physicians when the
expansive growth of medical technology precludes physicians from reasonably being able to
educate themselves fully about all of the side effects of different medications).
177. See Wilkerson v. Mid-America Cardiology, 908 S.W.2d 691, 696-97 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Mo. 1965); Wuerz v. Huffaker, 42 S.W.3d
652, 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)).
178. See Wilkerson, 908 S.W.2d at 697.
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the patients, individuals can make complete decisions regarding their personal
health.
A physician is not required to present to the patient a detailed description
of each and every option available.179 The physician need only disclose those
options which a “reasonable medical practitioner would [provide] under the
same or similar circumstances” to the patient.180 What a reasonable doctor
would disclose is based on the circumstances and facts of each case.
Importantly, Missouri courts have stated, “a reasonable doctor would not
necessarily disclose every possible alternative, nor would that doctor
necessarily disclose all details about the risks associated with each
alternative.”181 Thus, while physicians are required to provide patients with
sufficient information to make an informed decision, physicians are allowed
some leeway in using their best judgment to decide.
If physicians and patients are to be placed on an equal informational
footing regarding treatment, physicians must make sure that patients are
informed. Missouri has explicitly notified physicians that nothing less than
complete professional integrity in their treatment of patients is expected.
Missouri courts’ deference to a physician’s decision regarding medical
treatment further demonstrates their faith in the medical profession. Missouri
courts also assume that individuals with sufficient information can make their
own informed decisions.182 So, physicians are only required to disclose all
potentially threatening information to their patients, because patients can then
make their own informed decisions. Missouri presumes that individuals have
the capability to do so.
C. The Patient’s Individual Responsibility as a Driver—Lessening the
Physician’s Burden
Missouri caselaw asserts that public policy favors imposing a duty upon
professionals rather than on the individuals who actually inflict the injuries.183
However, to hold individuals responsible for their actions, including injuries
179. See id. at 697.
180. See id. at 698; Eichelberger v. Barnes Hosp., 655 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
181. See Wilkerson, 908 S.W.2d at 698.
182. The Washington standard has addressed this issue pertaining to giving warnings of
medication side effects. In Presleigh v. Lewis, the court held that drivers, when undertaking to
operate a vehicle, assume a duty to drive the vehicle in a reasonable manner so that they will not
physically injure another person or do damage to such person’s property. 534 P.2d 606 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1975). Upon being warned of the potential side effects of the medication, the driver has
the option of either gambling with the chance of driving or taking precautions and not operating
his vehicle under the intoxicating effects. See id. at 607-08.
183. In ascribing to the public policy analysis attributed to the Missouri Supreme Court’s
decision in Hoover’s Dairy, the facts of Robinson were applied to impose a duty to warn on
physicians. See Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, No. 58290, 2001 WL 212776, at *9
(Mo. Ct. App. March 5, 2001).
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inflicted by their own negligence, Missouri must take account of situations
where the patients have a clear informational advantage over the physician.
The patient should maintain individual responsibility for his actions when the
patient’s knowledge puts the physician at an informational disadvantage. In
such situations, the physician should still be under a duty to warn the patient of
any medication side effects, but will not be liable to third parties injured as a
result of the patient’s own negligence.
Missouri’s public policy stigmatizes any driver who gets behind the wheel
of a car while intoxicated. Missouri seeks to eliminate from the roadways all
drivers that are either intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, recognizing
that such drivers may cause injuries to others.184 Therefore, it should use both
criminal and civil law to do everything within its power to prevent drivers that
have such impairments from operating vehicles.185 Physicians may be in the
most ideal position to assist the state in fulfilling this interest.186 This assumes,
of course, that only when the physician is at an informational advantage over
the patient should he be held liable to third persons. Because consuming
alcohol is out of the control and knowledge of the physician, he is almost
always at a disadvantage even after discharging his duty to warn the patient of
any medication side effects.
Proximate cause must be proven when bringing a negligence claim against
a physician for failure to warn a patient of medication side effects. The injured
plaintiff needs to show that the breach of the physician’s duty to the patient
was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.187 Thus, the plaintiff would
need to show that the defendant physician knew or should have known that an
injury would have resulted due to the omission.188 A potential defense to this
proximate cause standard should be the patient’s intervening negligence, such
as alcohol impairment.189 While Missouri has discounted this defense, other

184. See id. at *11 (relying on Missouri criminal statutes that make it a crime to drive under
such situations). Compare Virgin v. Hopewell Center, No. 78857, 2001 WL 1155854, at *2 (Mo.
Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2001) (rendering court of appeals decision concurrently with Robinson).
185. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *11. Missouri has recently lowered the blood
alcohol content level needed to determine legal liability for driving while intoxicated to eighthundredths of one percent. See MO. REV. STAT. § 577.012 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001).
186. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *11.
187. See id. at *5. The standard used by the court in Robinson was “whether, after the
occurrences, the injury appears to be the reasonable and probable consequence of the act or
omission of the defendant.” See id.
188. See id. at *16.
189. To serve as an intervening cause, the act needs to be “independent of the original actor’s
negligence and severs the connection between the original actor’s conduct and the plaintiff’s
injury as a matter of law.” See Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, No. 58290, 2001 WL
212776, at *17 (Mo. Ct. App. March 5, 2001).
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jurisdictions include this defense in their physician duty to warn standard.190
Missouri should not allow physicians to be responsible by extending a duty to
the general public when intervening circumstances caused the patient’s
physical condition.191 If the patient consumed either alcohol or nonprescription drugs, the physician should not be held liable to the general
public. The moral blame attached to the individual’s behavior should negate
the physician’s potential duty.
Missouri courts recently deflected some of this responsibility away from
individuals. In Robinson, the court of appeals compared holding physicians
liable for failing to warn patients of medication side effects with the liability
imposed upon bartenders under the dramshop liability statute in Missouri.192
Missouri imposes a statutory duty for tavern keepers who provide a knowingly
intoxicated individual with additional alcohol.193 Thus, the court argued that
both physicians and bartenders should have parallel duties to the general
public. If a “mere bartender” is liable to the general public then a trained and
skilled physician should have a parallel duty to his patients.194 Certainly both
professions can help prevent intoxicated drivers or drivers under the influence
of medication from entering the roadways.195 By drawing this comparison,
Missouri can impose on physicians a liability to third parties if the physician
fails to discharge his duty to warn. Still, this comparison fails to consider the
patient’s intervening negligence. While the bartender’s liability will terminate
at the end of the night if the patron makes it safely home, many other factors
are involved in the physician-patient relationship. Most situations encountered
190. See id. at *16. Cf. Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 18-19 (Wash. 1965)
(making the defense of the driver’s intervening negligence a possible avenue for physicians).
191. Missouri has previously refused to impose a duty to warn on physicians when the
potential danger would be open and obvious to the patient. See Young v. Wadsworth, 916
S.W.2d 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Even the broadest duty to warn standard imposed by Texas
will not extend the duty to the general public when the patient is under the influence of another
substance, since the informational costs on the physicians are then higher. See Flynn v. Houston
Emergicare, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
192. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *13. The Missouri statute prohibiting dramshop
liability from being declared the proximate cause of injuries caused by intoxicated patrons caused
great controversy. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.053 (West 2000). However, this statute was
recently declared unconstitutional. See State ex rel. Dos Hombres-Independence, Inc. v. Nixon,
48 S.W.3d 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). In New Mexico, the plaintiff made the argument in Lester
that physicians should carry a duty to the public similar to that of a tavern-keeper, which the court
found to have no application to the situation presented. See Lester, 970 P.2d at 595 (stating that
since the legislature had enacted a statute that makes it illegal for bartenders to sell alcohol to
obviously intoxicated patrons, if bartenders act contrary to this statute, then they should rightfully
be held liable to any third persons who are injured as a result of the patron’s intoxication).
193. See Robinson, 2001 WL 212776, at *13.
194. See id.
195. See Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, No. 58290, 2001 WL 212776, at *13 (Mo.
Ct. App. March 5, 2001).
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will involve medication taken outside the control of the physician. The
physician, unlike the bartender, will not always have an informational
advantage over the patron, and he should not always be held liable to third
parties.
Washington provides a good example of a policy that allows personal
responsibility to mitigate professional liability. Washington’s policy of
deterring driving while intoxicated also emphasizes judicial support for
personal responsibility. In Hartley v. State, the Washington Supreme Court
relied on Kaiser and Peterson in holding county and State officials not liable to
the public for failing to revoke an intoxicated person’s driver’s license.196
Hartley did not involve a physician’s neglect to give a warning to the patient
who then injured a third person, but the duty applied in this case could have
had a similar consequence.197 In Hartley, the plaintiffs’ decedent was killed
when an intoxicated driver crossed the centerline into the decedent’s lane.198
The Washington State Department of Licensing had recently reinstated the
individual’s drivers license following a one-year revocation for other driving
while intoxicated offenses.199 The court emphasized that, as in Kaiser, liability
was imposed based on the defendant’s relationship to the third party that
caused the injury.200 Importantly, the cause in fact of the accident was the
intoxication of the driver, not the reinstatement of the license.201 Washington
case law advocates imposing responsibility and liability on individuals who
choose to drive while intoxicated instead of another entity.202 Such decisions
reinforce the inherent personal responsibility that members of the public,
especially the driving public, have when getting behind the wheel of a car.
Imposing a similar duty of individual responsibility upon drivers is needed to
deal with the intoxicating effects of prescribed medications.
Missouri should apply a policy similar to Washington’s when finding a
physician liable to the general driving public. Additional financial costs from
196. See Hartley v. State, 698 P.2d 77 (Wash. 1985) (en banc).
197. All of these situations involve consideration of the duty of the original actor, whether
that be the doctor, car owner or state official, to the plaintiff, based on injuries inflicted on the
plaintiff from driving impairments of a third party.
198. See Hartley, 698 P.2d at 79
199. See id. at 79.
200. See id. at 86; see also Pratt v. Thomas, 491 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Wash. 1972) (en banc)
(holding that an accident occurring with stolen car, and high speed police chase to recover the
vehicle, did not allow plaintiff to recover from defendant car owners due to lack of a “natural and
continuous sequence of events which flowed” from leaving the parked car).
201. See Hartley, 698 P.2d at 86 (arguing that to impose such a duty would be against public
policy because public and state officials would then be open to many such situations of liability in
the future).
202. See Hartley v. State, 698 P.2d 77, 86 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) (stating that the state’s
failure to continue to revoke the driver’s license to drive was “too remote and insubstantial to
impose liability” for the drunk driving of the third party driver).
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imposing a physician duty to the general public should favor patient
responsibility over physician liability. Missouri has and must consider any
economic burdens on physicians and its ability to spread the risk of liability
beyond the physician-patient relationship.203 One additional burden that must
be considered is the cost of additional liability insurance for physicians.204
Missouri courts, however, have dismissed this policy consideration, stating that
the duty owed to the patient would also satisfy the physician’s duty owed to
the general public.205 Courts make the argument that the physician would not
be burdened with any more responsibility than already imposed upon him as
part of his profession. This analysis does address discharging the duty owed to
both the patient and the public. However, this fails to acknowledge the
financial burden imposed on physicians.206 Patients will absorb at least some
of the burden if physicians can plead an intervening negligence defense.
Physicians would, however, still possess a duty to warn the patient, but with no
additional financial risk. The intervening negligence defense would not only
reinforce Missouri’s public interest in individual driver responsibility, it would
also create a level informational playing field between physicians, patients and
third parties. Therefore, Missouri should establish this defense.
D. Discharging the Duty to Warn—Not Yet Discussed in Missouri Case Law
Even if Missouri allows for an intervening negligence defense, Missouri’s
current public policy seems to favor expanding physician liability to third
persons. Given this trend, it is important for Missouri to set a standard that

203. Missouri courts must also address the issue of additional costs associated with placing a
duty to warn third persons on physicians. As suggested earlier, there are grounds for concern
when claims against physicians for failure to warn of medication side effects are removed from
the legal category of medical malpractice and placed into general negligence. See Almason,
supra note 16, at 490 (expressing concern for the integrity of the professional medical community
as a result of this increased burden). Physicians can no longer be covered by medical malpractice
insurance given this situation. See id. As a result, a potential gap in insurance coverage will
result, imposing greater financial responsibilities upon physicians. See id. Missouri may be able
to effectively curb this increased burden on physicians by limiting the application of the duty to
warn in Missouri.
204. See id.
205. See id. (implying that the court was enforcing not only the duty to warn the patient but
also to protect the general public).
206. While not discussed in the decision of Robinson, other jurisdictions have considered the
state’s interest in ensuring complete and adequate medical treatment for patients. When weighing
the burden imposed upon physicians against this desire for good medical care, some jurisdictions
have concluded that the risk that physicians would protect their own medical integrity rather than
making sure patients receive the best medical care was too high and would be against the public
policy of that jurisdiction. See Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d 590 (N.M. 1998).
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defines when the physician’s duty to warn is discharged.207 To be safe,
Missouri should require physicians to warn patients at the time that the
medication is given. Other jurisdictions that have addressed this requirement
have stated that it is at this point that the necessity to warn is discharged.208
Missouri should consider adopting New Mexico’s standard which imposes a
duty on the physician proportionate to the amount of control that the physician
has over the administration of the medication.209 Thus, in emergency room
situations, for example, a duty to warn the patient would be imposed only
where the physician personally administered a drug to the patient while in the
emergency room. If the patient receives medication either orally in the form of
a pill or through an injection, the physician should be under a heightened duty
to the general public because the physician was in control of the
administration. The physician would still have a duty to warn the patient of the
side effects if the medication was to be taken outside of the physician’s
presence, but the possibility of conditions beyond his control interfering would
mitigate the physician’s liability to the general driving public.
VI. CONCLUSION
A physician’s liability to third persons in Missouri should be premised on a
desire to ensure that Missouri drivers remain individually responsible for their
own negligence. All Missouri courts should advocate a policy of personal
responsibility when dealing with issues related to the general driving public.
Missouri courts will likely rely heavily on the holdings of other jurisdictions
that have considered this issue of duty. The jurisdictions that provide a good
variety of considerations to choose from include Texas, Washington and New
Mexico.
The trend of recent Missouri case law has been to impose greater burdens
and duties upon physicians. However, Missouri has not imposed on a
physician a duty to the general public. Nevertheless, the State’s courts seem to
be headed in that direction. As such, the Missouri judiciary should adopt a
standard that holds physicians liable under a general duty to warn standard that
may be mitigated by a driver’s intervening negligence.
The potential effects on the professional community of finding that
physicians owe a duty to the general driving public may be quite extreme. For
this reason, Missouri needs to adopt a strict standard of duty to make sure that
physicians are explicitly aware of their potential liabilities. We must not forget

207. This issue was not discussed by the court of appeals in the Robinson decision. See
generally Robinson v. Health Midwest Dev. Group, No. 58290, 2001 WL 212776 (Mo. Ct. App.
March 5, 2001).
208. This is a slightly more stringent standard than that imposed by the states of Texas and
Washington, but follows the same general principles.
209. See supra notes 78-79.
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that cases in which a duty will be imposed will involve fact-specific
circumstances. Thus, in certain situations, such as that presented in Robinson,
the facts will be too sensitive to enable courts to impose a greater burden upon
all physicians. Nevertheless, Missouri courts should find a general duty to the
driving public. If Missouri courts choose to do so, interested parties, such as
physicians, medical staff and even attorneys, will likely push for a bright-line
test in the form of legislation. Without legislation in place, judicial
administration costs for determining these cases of duty may be too great.
Unless Missouri adopts a stringent standard, the public peril of Tarasoff will
continue.
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